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Abstract
This paper looks into the search behavior of consumers in the market for health insurance
contracts. We consider the recent health insurance reform in The Netherlands, where a private-
public mix of insurance provision was replaced by a system based on managed competition.
Although all insurers offer the same basic package (determined by the government), there is
substantial premium dispersion. We develop a simple consumer search model containing the
main features of the Dutch health insurance system. This model provides us with a number
of hypotheses, which we test using data from the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel. The
data confirm the standard predictions on consumer choice (i.e. there is adverse selection and
a lower premium increases coverage). We also find that consumers with lower search costs are
more likely to receive a group contract offer. This generates a situation of price discrimination
where individuals without group contracts and higher search costs pay higher premiums and
buy lower insurance coverage.
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1 Introduction
Competitive markets are welfare maximizing, and the law of one price should hold. In
many markets there is, however, a substantial degree of price dispersion. This may either be
because products are not homogenous, or because consumers face costs to obtain information
about prices. Firms can exploit their market power to set prices above marginal costs.
Consumer search models are often used to describe such markets. This paper focuses on
the Dutch health insurance market, and tests to what degree and under what conditions
a simple consumer search model can describe the behavior of consumers in this market.
In the empirical analyses, we exploit a major health insurance reform which took place in
the Netherlands on January 1, 2006. The reform forced everyone to reassess their health
insurance contract.
Before the reform there was a mix of private and public insurance against the costs of
health care. In the new system, which is one of managed competition, all insurers compete
with each other within rules set by the government. The current Dutch system has many
similarities with the Swiss health insurance system, and is an inspiration for the health
insurance reforms of the Obama administration. These ambitions have renewed international
interest in incentives for competition between health insurers.
The Dutch regulations oblige everyone to buy a basic insurance package of which the
content is determined by the government. Insurance companies are not allowed to refuse
applicants for this basic package and to differentiate premiums by any measure of risk (age,
health, etc.). A Risk Equalization Fund compensates insurers who have a disproportionate
number of high-risk individuals among their insurees. Insurance companies are free to set
their own price for the basic insurance package and to compete for insurees. A recent
survey indicated that consumers primarily focus on premiums in the decision process (Dutch
Healthcare Authority, 2006). If individuals indeed search sufficiently for the lowest premium,
the system should provide incentives to insurers to improve their efficiency and lower their
premiums. Consumer search for a health insurance, therefore, plays an essential role in
this system. However, the annual premium for the basic coverage ranges from e990 to
e1170. By switching insurer some people could, therefore, save up to 15% of the insurance
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premium, which suggests that individuals do not have full information or that search costs
are prohibitively high. A second contribution of this paper is that it provides more insight
into consumer search behavior in a system of managed competition.
We provide a simple consumer search model, which builds on Stahl (1989), Janssen and
Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) and Janssen, Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildebeest (2005). Individuals
in our model are heterogeneous in their health, which determines their utility of insurance
coverage. Each individual receives an offer for health insurance from their current insurer,
and, in addition, may receive an offer for a group contract. These group contracts are
mostly offered via employers and give a discount on the premium. After having received the
offer(s), individuals decide whether or not to search the market for a lower priced insurance
contract. This decision depends on the individual’s search costs. We consider the case in
which individuals are heterogeneous in search costs and in the probability of receiving an
offer for a group contract.
The model provides a number of testable predictions on insurance choice and search be-
havior. We use data from the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel collected by the Nether-
lands Institute for Health Services Research (NIVEL). Participants in the consumer panel
complete questionnaires frequently, and, therefore, the data are extensive on choice and
search for insurance contracts. The data confirm the predictions on insurance choice (i.e.
there is adverse selection and a lower premium increases coverage). The search behavior of
the individuals in the data matches the predictions from a model where the probability to
receive a group offer is negatively correlated with search costs. This generates a situation
of price discrimination which causes that individuals without an offer for a group contract
(and most likely higher search costs) pay a higher premium, and also buy less extensive in-
surance coverage. Stahl (1989) argues that reducing the number of informed consumers (as
is the case in the market for individuals without group contracts) leads to more dispersion
in premiums. From this observation one may question the usefulness of allowing for group
contracts. After all, without group contracts there would be less variation in both premiums
and insurance coverage, which might equalize access to health care within the population.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on consumer search models, and par-
ticularly to the small literature on search in insurance markets. Maestas, Schroeder and
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Goldman (2009) estimate search costs in the Medigap market using the equilibrium model
for price dispersion developed by Carlson and McAfee (1983). They find that average search
costs equal $72. Pauly, Herring and Song (2002) consider the choice for health insurance and
Brown and Goolsbee (2002) focus on the market for life insurance. Both papers use data
from the US to investigate the consequences of the introduction of internet search, which
should have lowered search costs. Both papers show that empirical predictions are in agree-
ment with consumer search models (e.g. Stahl, 1989). Sorensen (2000, 2001) considers the
retail market for prescription drugs. Sorensen (2000) concludes that less than one-third of
the price dispersion can be attributed to pharmacy heterogeneity. All papers use, however,
the observed distribution of prices to infer the importance of incomplete information and
search. Our data contain direct measures for individual search behavior. Furthermore, we
study a well-defined institutional setting in which the rules and timing of actions are highly
regulated.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: section 2 provides more background and details
on the reform of the health insurance system in The Netherlands. Section 3 presents the
search model. The data used for the empirical part are discussed in section 4, and section
5 gives results of the empirical analyses. Section 6 discusses the use of group contracts by
insurers. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Dutch health insurance reform
In the Netherlands, the health insurance system is split into three compartments. The
first compartment, the catastrophic insurance, is a public insurance that covers the entire
population. It insures individuals against the costs of long-term care (e.g. nursing homes,
and mental health institutions). The second compartment includes insurable risk and care
that all individuals should have access to. The third and last compartment is supplementary
coverage. The Dutch health insurance reform in 2006 only affected the second and third
compartment. Total health care expenditures as a percentage of GDP were, both before and
after the reform, average for European standards. As shown in Figure 1, expenditures (9.8%
in 2007) were well below those of the United States (16.0%) and also Switzerland (10.8%),
3
Figure 1: Total health care expenditures as percentage of GDP (Source: OECD).
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but above the United Kingdom (8.5%).
We will first briefly discuss the old system. Next, we will provide details on the new
system and on how the reform, the transition from the old to the new system, was executed.
2.1 The old system
Before the reform, there was a mix of public and private insurance provision in the second
compartment. All head of the households earning less than some income threshold were
compulsory insured, as were their dependents, under the Sickness Fund Act. In 2005 the
income threshold was e33,000 for employees and benefit recipients, and e21,050 for self-
employed. For pensioners eligibility depended on Sickness Fund coverage at age 65. The
Sickness Funds covered about 65% of the population.1 The Sickness Fund Act guaranteed an
extensive coverage against a relatively low insurance premium. In 2004, the annual premium
1Some civil servants (for example, the police force) were covered by a compulsory insurance scheme
irrespective of their income. This was about 5% of the total population.
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paid directly to the insurer was only about e300.2 The main source of funding were income-
related contributions made by workers covered by the public insurance and their employers.3
Individuals earning more than the income threshold had to buy health insurance in the
private market.4 Individuals were free to choose their insurer and the extent to which they
wished to be covered. In practice, private insurance plans were in coverage, care provider
and quality of care very similar to Sickness Fund insurance (with the exception of optional
deductibles). However, the premium had to fully cover the costs, and, therefore, premiums
were diversified by, for example, age and health risks. For a 30-year old without health
problems the insurance premium for coverage similar to that of the sickness funds was about
e2760 per year.5 The left-hand side of Figure 2 summarizes the old system, the right-hand
side the new system.
2.2 The new system
On January 1, 2006, a system of managed competition was introduced in the second compart-
ment. The distinction between Sickness Fund insurance and private insurance disappeared,
and the former providers of Sickness Fund insurance were transformed into private insur-
ance companies. Within the second-compartment all insurers offer the same basic health
insurance package of which the content is determined by the government. Coverage of this
basic insurance is less extensive than the coverage under the former Sickness Fund Act. It
is compulsory for all inhabitants of The Netherlands to obtain basic insurance from one of
the insurers. Insurers are obliged to accept everyone, and are not allowed to differentiate
premiums (community rating). A Risk Equalization Fund was introduced to compensate in-
surers for an eventual disproportionate percentage of ’high-risk’ insurees.6 Insurers primarily
2In 2005, a no-claim was introduced to reduce moral hazard problems. Insurees who did not visit a
specialist or hospital or used prescribed medication could receive a cashback up to e225. The introduction
of the no-claim increased insurance premiums with about 24%.
3The contribution was 7.95% of income, of which 6.25% was to be paid by the employer.
4Chronically ill with a high income, who would be refused by private insurers were covered by a special
insurance.
5However, most employees received compensation of about 50% of the premium from their employer for
having to take private health insurance.
6The Risk Equalization Fund uses gender/age category interactions, main source of income (as a proxy
for socioeconomic status), region, long-term medication use (categorized in 20 groups), and medical diagnosis
(in 13 groups).
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Figure 2: The Dutch health insurance reform.
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Figure 3: Histogram annual insurance premium.
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compete on the price of the basic insurance package, as the quality of the delivered care was
equal among insurers (they all offer access to all providers).
In 2006, the market consisted of 33 insurance companies. Some of these operated under
more than one label, so that in total 43 basic insurance packages were offered. The average
nominal premium was about e1050 per year.7 However, there was substantial dispersion in
premiums. Figure 3 shows that annual premiums range from e990 to e1170.8
Insurance companies also offer supplementary insurance, including, for example, den-
tal care, extended coverage for treatment by physiotherapists, treatment of mental illnesses,
coverage for alternative medicine, etc. About 80% of the insurers offer a range of supplemen-
tary packages for all care except dental care and have a separate range of dental insurance
plans. The other insurers combine dental and supplementary insurance in one plan. Most
insurers offer three (49%) or four (23%) different supplementary plans, ranging from limited
additional coverage to very extensive coverage. Supplementary insurance is elective, and
7Children under age 18 are covered by their parents’ insurance and their premium is paid by the gov-
ernment.
8There is no systematic difference in price level between former Sickness Funds and private insurers.
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both the premium and composition is decided by the insurer. Although insurers are allowed
to select for the supplementary insurance, most insurers do not. Insurers that do select,
only do this for the plan with the most extensive supplementary coverage. Only one insurer
differentiated premiums for supplementary plans by age. In 2006, in total 137 different sup-
plementary plans were available in the market, with an annual premium ranging from e59
to e930 (see Dutch Health Care Authority, 2006). Of these 137 plans, 10 plans required
answering questions about the insurees’ health. Supplementary coverage is very popular,
92.6% of consumers obtained some kind of supplementary insurance.
The basic insurance does not involve copayments, but the system allows individuals to
choose for a deductible up to e500. The annual reduction in basic insurance premium was
about e36 for every e100 additional deductible. However, this option was not very popular,
more than 95% of all individuals did not take any voluntary deductible. Insurers are allowed
to offer group contracts, and to grant a premium reduction of at most 10% on the basic and
supplementary insurance in these group contracts. The majority of the group contracts were
offered via employers, but also other groups, such as labor unions, could negotiate group
contracts for their members. If an individual received an offer for a group contract, then
also the partner was eligible for the discount. In 2006, about 44% of all individuals were
participating in a group contract, and the average discount was about 7.5% (Vektis, 2007).
The differentiation in supplementary insurance packages makes the comparison of pre-
miums more difficult than for basic insurance. Insurers might exploit this, for example, by
setting a low premium for basic insurance and high premiums for supplementary insurance.
To get some idea about the pricing strategy of insurers, we first consider only insurers with
separate dental plans. Recall that 80% of all insurers has separate dental plans and that the
other 20% includes dental care in supplementary packages. Figure 4 plots for these insurers
the average premium for a supplementary insurance plan against the price of the basic insur-
ance package. There is a strong and significant correlation between the premium for basic
insurance and the average premium for supplementary coverage (0.703 and significant at the
1% level). Next, we also take account of dental plans by adding the average premium for
dental insurance. Furthermore, we include the remaining 20% insurers, who include dental
coverage in their supplementary insurance plans. As can be seen from the scatter plot in
8
Figure 4: Scatterplot of premium for basic insurance package and the average price of sup-
plementary insurance.
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Figure 5, the correlation remains positive and significant (0.528 and significant at the 1%
level). Rather than cross-subsidizing between basic and supplementary insurances, the pos-
itive correlations seem to suggest that there are more expensive and cheaper insurers in the
market. The analyses above are robust against taking the average supplementary package.
Considering, for example, the cheapest or most expensive package gives similar results.
2.3 The reform
The reform was announced long before January 1, 2006. A large media campaign was set
up to inform people about the new health insurance system, and to explain the rules. In
October 2005, 98.8% of the respondents in our data knew about the reform. In December
2005, every insurance company had to inform their insurees about the insurance packages
it was going to offer under the new health insurance system and their premiums.9 Insurers
offered their insurees as default option a combination of basic insurance and supplementary
insurance plan that was closest to the individual’s old insurance plan. Individuals could
9Most insurers already announced the premium for the basic insurance in October or November 2005.
However, some insurers lowered their premium after learning the premiums of their competitors.
9
Figure 5: Scatterplot of premium for basic insurance package and the average price of sup-
plementary insurance plus dental insurance, or a combined plan.
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change insurer or the level of supplementary coverage until May 1, 2006, but the insurance
bought provided coverage in retrospect from January 1. In the year of the introduction,
insurers were also obliged to accept all their former insurees for any level of supplementary
coverage until March 1.10 This implied that almost all changes in insurer or supplementary
coverage occurred before March 1.
All health insurance contracts run from January 1 to December 31. Insurers have to post
their premiums and conditions for the following year in December, and individuals can only
change insurer during the month of January. So, the long period for switching only applied
to the year of the introduction of the new system.
3 A consumer search model for health insurance
This section discusses a search model for a health insurance and derives a number of em-
pirically testable predictions. The model is as simple as possible without loosing the main
10It was also announced that in later years insurers could deny supplemental insurance coverage for new
clients.
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characteristics of the Dutch health insurance market. First, consumers receive an offer for
insurance from their current insurer, which is the default. Second, some consumers also
receive an offer for a group contract, which gives a discount on the premium. Third, insurers
post premiums both for basic insurance and one type of supplementary insurance, and have
to accept all applicants. Fourth, if consumers decide to search the market, they observe all
prices. The most simplifying assumption is that we impose that all insurers offer the same
two insurance packages: basic insurance (which we refer to as ‘low coverage’), and basic
insurance plus supplementary insurance (which is ‘high coverage’). In reality insurers offer
several supplementary packages, that differ in level of coverage. However, the intuition from
the model is the same if we would extend it to allow for more packages, but this would
complicate the analysis.
3.1 Consumer behavior
Each consumer i is characterized by his health hi, which is in the population distributed
according to the distribution function G(h). Each insurer offers the same two insurance
packages. All consumers derive the same (expected) utility ul from the insurance package
with low coverage (only basic insurance). The expected utility consumers derive from high
coverage (basic plus supplementary insurance) depends on the consumers’ health uh(hi). In
particular, individuals in good health derive less expected utility from an insurance with
high coverage than individuals in bad health, so u′h(hi) < 0. Health hi could thus also be
interpreted as a measure of expected health care.
At the introduction of the new health insurance system, each consumer receives an offer
from her current insurer. The offer is characterized by a premium p0,i for insurance with
low coverage and (1 + β)p0,i for insurance with high coverage. We impose that each insurer
increases the premium with the same fraction β for obtaining supplementary insurance,
which seems in agreement with the observed pricing structure outlined in Subsection 2.2.
The default level of coverage is the level closest to the previous contract, but we assume
that switching to the other coverage level of the same insurer is costless for the individual
(as she is costlessly informed about all coverage levels by his former insurer). Obviously,
an individual prefers the insurance with high coverage if uh(hi)− ul > βp0,i. The left-hand
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side of the inequality is decreasing in (good) health, and the right-hand side is increasing in
the premium p0,i. This implies that individuals are more likely to take insurance with high
coverage if they are in bad health (adverse selection), or if the premium p0,i is low.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with worse health are more likely to buy health insurance with
high coverage (adverse selection).
Hypothesis 2: A lower premium induces individuals to take more health insurance cover-
age.
Consumer i has a probability δi of receiving an offer for a group contract. The premium of
the offered group contract is pg,i for low coverage and (1+β)pg,i for high coverage. Individuals
prefer the group contract if pg,i < p0,i, which also implies that those individuals who decide
to take the group contract are more likely to take insurance with high coverage. Let pns,i
denote the lowest premium individual i gets offered without having searched the market.
So, without an offer for a group contract pns,i = p0,i, and with an offer for a group contract
pns,i = min{p0,i, pg,i}.
After individuals are informed about the insurance premium of their current insurer, and
possibly also have received an offer for a group contract, they can decide whether to search the
market for an insurer offering a lower premium. Before searching the market the consumer
only knows that the distribution of premiums in the market equals F (p). This assumption
is very similar to Carlson and McAfee (1983) and Maestas, Schroeder and Goldman (2009),
who assume that individuals know the rank of a premium, but do not know where the lowest
premium is offered. If the consumer decides to search, she makes cost ci, and will observe
all premiums of all N insurers in the market. We assume that when consumers search, they
observe all premiums in the market, because the government had launched a website where
consumers could compare insurance plans between insurers. It explicitly aimed at lowering
search costs. Independent consumer organizations followed with their own websites. In our
data, over 60% of the individuals who searched for a better offer indicate that they used
such websites. Our search assumption also has the advantage that we do not have to impose
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that search is with replacement (e.g. Carlson and McAfee, 1983; and Maestas, Schroeder
and Goldman, 2009), which seems unrealistic in markets with few suppliers.
Obviously, the consumer will switch to another insurer if any of the other N − 1 insurers
in the market offers a lower premium than the current best offer pns.
11 The lowest premium
pmin of the other N − 1 insurers in the market is the first order-statistic of N − 1 draws from
the distribution function F (p), which has expected value
E[pmin] =
∫
FN−1(p)dp.
Individuals only search if their expected benefits exceed search costs ci. The expected benefits
are in terms of finding an insurer with a lower insurance premium. An individual searches if
max {uh(hi)− (1 + β)pns,i, ul − pns,i} < max {uh(hi)− (1 + β)E[pmin], ul − E[pmin]} − ci.
It is obvious that individuals with low search costs are more likely to search. For individuals
who received an offer for a group contract, pns,i is the lowest of two offers rather than just the
initial offer. This implies that for a consumer with an offer for a group contract the left-hand
side will in expectations be smaller (expected gains from continued search are smaller). Such
an individual is thus less likely to devote additional effort to search the market for a better
offer.
For ease of exposition we assume that the support of F (p) is bounded from [p, p¯]. We can
distinguish three types of individuals. First, individuals in bad health who always choose
health insurance with a high coverage. For these individuals health hi is below h for which
uh(h) − ul = βp¯. Second, there are individuals in such good health that they always only
take insurance with low coverage, so hi exceeds h¯ for which uh(h¯) − ul = βp. And third,
there are individuals with health hi between h and h¯ who prefer insurance with low coverage
in case of high premium p¯ and insurance with high coverage in case of low premium p.
For individuals in such bad health that they always prefer health insurance with high
11If an individual also received an offer for a group contract, there are in fact only N − 2 other insurers.
Only if the offer for a group contract is with the same insurer the individual was previously insured with,
there are still N−1 other insurers. For ease of exposition we ignore this, as taking account of this complicates
notation without changing our testable predictions.
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coverage, the search decision simplifies to
(1 + β)pns,i > (1 + β)E[pmin] + ci or pns,i > E[pmin] +
ci
1 + β
.
For individuals in good health that always prefer to have low coverage, the search decision
is
pns,i > E[pmin] + ci.
If premiums and search costs do not depend on the health status, the above implies that
individuals in bad health have a lower premium threshold for searching than individuals in
good health.
Individuals in the third group only obtain health insurance with high coverage if the
premium is sufficiently low. If an individual searches the market (or receives an offer for
a group contract) she may find a premium that is lower than the initial offer. For some
individuals in the third group this premium will be sufficiently low to make the expected
utility of high coverage larger than the expected utility from low coverage. Therefore, some
individuals who switch insurer to get a lower premium might also switch to a health insurance
package with high coverage.
In our model, there are three sources of heterogeneity: individuals differ in their health
status hi, search costs ci and probability of receiving an offer for a group contract δi. All three
elements are important in the decision to search, and also determine the level of insurance
coverage that is chosen. If health status, search costs and the probability of receiving a group
contract are independently distributed within the population, then (i) both bad health and
low search costs induce more search, and (ii) actually receiving a group offer reduces search.
However, there are good reasons to believe that within the population the different sources
of heterogeneity may be correlated to each other. Since search costs are usually unobserved,
the question arises how a correlation between search costs and health and the probability
to receive an offer for a group contract affects the way in which search in the population is
correlated to both health and receiving an offer for a group contract. Table 1 summarizes
these effects. Search costs and health have the same effect on the decision to search. So if
search costs and health are negatively correlated, we may observe within the population that
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Table 1: Population correlation between search and both health and group offers.
corr(h, search)
corr (h, c) = 0 -
corr (h, c) < 0 -/+
corr (h, c) > 0 -
corr(δ, search)
corr (δ, c) = 0 -
corr (δ, c) < 0 -/+
corr (δ, c) > 0 -
(good) health is not or even positively correlated to searching. Similarly, low search costs
and receiving an offer for a group contract both induce individuals to search. This implies
that we can only observe individuals with a group offer to search more than individuals
without a group offer if search costs are negatively correlated to the probability of receiving
a group offer.
Corollary 1: Receiving a group offer can only be positively correlated to search if the prob-
ability of receiving a group offer is negatively correlated to search costs.
Corollary 2: Health can only be positively correlated to searching, if health and search
costs are negatively correlated.
Before taking the model to the data, we will discuss the assumptions made in the model.
In the model we made four important assumptions. We will discuss the robustness of the
model against deviations from these assumptions. First, we imposed that there is dispersion
of premiums in the market, i.e. F (p) is non-atomic. In the next subsection we sketch
the behavior of insurers to argue that in equilibrium there is indeed premium dispersion.
However, if there would not be any dispersion of premiums in the market, search would
never be beneficial (recall that one starts with an offer and search is costly). In this case,
consumer behavior would reduce to only choosing between low and high coverage for which
the model predicts adverse selection.
The second key assumption is that we imposed that the premium for insurance with
high coverage is proportional to basic health insurance. Recall that this assumption is
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justified by the observed premiums for basic and supplementary insurance (see Subsection
2.2). Alternatively, we could choose an additive specification implying that the premium
for health insurance with high coverage equals p + β. Such a specification implies that
consumers choose between basic insurance and insurance with high coverage on comparing
uh(hi)−ul and β. Since this is independent of the premium, individuals make their coverage
choice already before learning about the initial offer. The individual’s health status affects
the decision for coverage, but is no longer relevant in the choice for searching. The model
thus simplifies to a consumer search model with homogeneous products. And the reason for
premium dispersion is that individuals are heterogenous in their search costs.
The third key assumption is that individuals who search the market observe all premiums
in the market. Also Salop and Stiglitz (1977) make this assumption, but more recent search
models usually assume that when searching, consumers see premiums sequentially, and make
search costs for observing each additional premium. However, our predictions are robust
against changing the search rule. Both search rules generate dispersion of premiums in
equilibrium, and similar behavioral predictions for consumers.
The final key assumption is that individuals know the distribution of premiums F (p).
However, individuals may not know this distribution, but only have some personal belief Bi
about the shape of the distribution. Before individuals decide to search, they first receive an
initial offer p0,i and maybe an offer for a group contract pg,i. Individuals use these offers to
update their beliefs, and the search decision depends on E[pmin|p0,i, pg,i, Bi]. The interesting
feature is thus that a group offer provides additional information. Individuals with an offer
for a group contract thus may have more accurate information about the distribution of
premiums in the market.
3.2 Premium dispersion in equilibrium
The testable predictions for consumer behavior depend on existence of premium dispersion.
In this subsection, we argue that this should be present in equilibrium. Suppose there are
N insurers in the market, which all have the same marginal costs m for insurance with
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basic coverage and (1+ β)m for insurance with high coverage.12 Insurers only differ in their
pre-reform market share θj for j = 1, . . . , m.
Each insurer keeps its clients if these do not get an offer for a group contract with a
lower premium, and in addition do not search. Only the insurer with the lowest premium in
the market attracts individuals who decide to search. We assume that each insurer has the
same market share in group contracts as their overall market share. We furthermore assume
that all insurers give the same discount α on the premium when they make an offer for a
group contract to a potential client. These assumptions are mainly made for simplification,
such that the decision process of firms is one dimensional, i.e. setting the level of the basic
insurance premium.
From the behavior of consumers we know that there is heterogeneity in search behavior,
for example, because individuals in bad health undertake search at a lower expected premium
reduction than individuals in good health. Insurers with a high market share can post a
relatively high premium, which would imply that they might lose some individuals who get
an offer for a group contract from an other insurer, and some individuals with bad health or
with low search costs who search the market for better offers. The big insurer would thus
lose some market share, but make a relatively high profit per insuree. An insurer with a low
market share might post a much lower premium to avoid losing relatively many insurees who
get an offer for a group contract from an other insurer, and to induce the clients of other
insurers to search the market. This means that the small insurer makes a relatively low
profit per insuree, but gains, relative to its market share, many new insurees (if it manages
to become the insurer with the lowest premium). Obviously, the degree of price dispersion
depends on the distribution of the search costs ci, but also the variation in market shares θj
and the distribution of health G(h) in the population are important.
Premium dispersion is not only a theoretical prediction. After the Dutch health insur-
ance reform substantial premium dispersion was observed in the market (see again Figure
3). Indeed, the lowest premium in the market was posted by a small insurer (named Ander-
Zorg). Relating premiums to market shares is difficult, because insurers are very cautious in
12Obviously, marginal costs should depend on the health status of the insuree. However, recall that the
Risk Equalization Fund compensates insurers for insuring individuals in bad health in such way that the
expected costs of all insurees are the same.
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providing information on market shares. However, in the newspapers one of the five insurers
with over one million insurees (Agis, which posted the highest premium among them) was
considered to be the biggest loser of the reform. The other four insurers with over a million
insurees mainly maintained their market share because of writing many group contracts. In
particular, using our own data to calculate the fraction of group contracts, there is a sub-
stantial, positive correlation (0.40) between the premium posted by insurers and the fraction
of insurees covered by a group contract.
4 The data
Our data are from the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel which is collected by the Nether-
lands Institute for Health Services Research (NIVEL). The panel contains about 1500 indi-
viduals, and is aimed to be representative for the overall population. For women the age
structure in the panel largely coincides with the Dutch population, for men older individu-
als are somewhat overrepresented in the panel. Individuals in the consumer panel complete
questionnaires on health care, health insurance and related issues between two and five times
per year. After two to three years panel members are replaced to maintain representative-
ness. The content varies substantially between questionnaires. In the empirical analyses
we use information from the 15 questionnaires send out between 2004 and 2008. This ob-
servation period covers the time period around the Dutch health insurance reform (2006).
Most questionnaires are not sent to all panel members, in order not to overwhelm them with
questionnaires. Usually around 70% of the panel members are randomly selected to receive
a particular questionnaire. Combining variables from different questionnaires thus quickly
reduces the sample size. Socioeconomic and other background variables are only asked once,
at the moment a participant first enters the consumer panel.
In December 2005, a month before the introduction of the new system, participants
answered a set of questions about the offer they received from their current insurer. It was
also asked whether they were planning to search for better deals offered by other insurers.
The April 2006 questionnaire contains information on actual consumer search behavior,
the choice of the insurance plan and insurer, as well as information on the total number
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
offer for group contract
no yes
fraction 28% 72%
age (in years) 56 51
female 60% 55%
couple 76% 81%
has children 35% 47%
low income 39% 29%
very low income 12% 6%
years of education 12 12
employed 35% 58%
retired 44% 28%
physical health (1-5 scale; 1=excellent, 5=very poor) 3.0 2.8
mental health (1-5 scale; 1=excellent, 5=very poor) 2.4 2.4
expected health care use (1-5 scale; 1= very much, 5=very little) 2.8 2.7
changed insurer 11% 25%
changed plan, same insurer 12% 15%
has deductible 7% 7%
has supplementary insurance 96% 95%
annual total insurance premium (in e) 1298 1271
annual premium basic insurance (in e) 1049 1006
annual premium supplementary insurance (in e) 247 265
basic insurance premium before discount (in e) 1049 1053
supplementary insurance premium before discounts (in e) 247 281
health insurance from sickness fund in 2005 66% 58%
private health insurance in 2005 30% 36%
civil servant health insurance in 2005 4% 7%
observations 322 844
of offers for a group contract participants had received, and whether they accepted one
of these offers for a group contract. We thus know the names of the pre-reform and the
post-reform insurer and hence whether the individual has switched insurer. We observe
whether an individual participates in a group contract, has a voluntary deductible, and has
supplementary insurance coverage. We do not know the extent of the supplemental insurance
coverage. However, individuals were asked to report the total amount of premium they pay
for health insurance. We combine this information with external information about the
premium for basic coverage of each insurer (and the reduced premium for participation in a
group contract), which allows us to determine the amount paid for supplemental coverage.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics. We distinguish between individuals with
and without an offer for a group contract. More than 70% of all individuals received an offer
for a group contract. Individuals with an offer for a group contract are more often employed,
and less often retired, so they are also, on average, younger, have a higher income, and are
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higher educated.13 Recall that about two-third of the group contracts are with employers,
and one-third with labor unions, consumer organizations, etc.14 Group contracts give an
average reduction of about 6.5% on the basic insurance, and a 8.5% reduction in premium
for supplementary insurance (Dutch Healthcare Authority, 2006). Couples are more likely to
receive an offer for a group contract, mainly because such an offer covers all family members.
There are, however, no differences in self-assessed physical and mental health between both
groups, neither in the average nor in the distribution. Also expected health care use is
very similar. Self-assessed health was only asked when individuals first entered the panel15,
while expected health care use was asked in April 2006, after individuals made their health
insurance choice.
Individuals with an offer for a group contract change insurer and insurance plan more
often, but have a similar health insurance plan in terms of choice for a deductible and the
presence of supplementary coverage. Individuals with a group contract pay in total only
3.1% less on health insurance while they receive about 6.5% discount on the premium for
the basic insurance package. Comparing premiums that are paid, individuals with an offer for
a group contract spend more on supplementary insurance, both before and after discounts.
Table 3 compares health insurance decisions in our sample to nationwide behavior. In our
sample more individuals have a group contract (55%) than nationwide (44%). In terms of
supplementary insurance, voluntary deductibles and insurance premium our sample matches
the nationwide statistics fairly well.
The questionnaire of April 2006 contained a question on consumer search behavior. In
particular, individuals were asked to answer the question: Did you search for a new health
insurance contract? Table 4 displays the fraction of individuals searching the market. In
total about 46% of the individuals reports to have searched actively for other health insurance
plans. Search is more common among individuals who have received at least one offer for
a group contract. Only about 30% of all individuals did not receive an offer for a group
13We do not observe income directly, but rather observe the amount of government compensation an
individual receives. Very low income households (less than e17,500 per year) receive the maximum annual
compensation of e402.96 for a single, and e1155.00 for a couple. Partial (income dependent) compensation
was paid to low income household (below e25,068 for singles and e40,120 for couples).
14These are national level figures. In our sample we observe that 85% of the group contracts is obtained
via the employer
15Since individuals are replaced every two to three years, this information is at most three years old.
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Table 3: Sample descriptives and national statistics.
Sample National∗
Percentage with insurance on group contract 55% 44%
Percentage with supplementary insurance 95% 93%
percentage among insured on group contract 96% 94%
percentage among individually insured 94% 92%
Percentage switch insurer 21% 18%
percentage among insured on group contract 30% 28%
percentage among individually insured 11% 10%
Percentage with deductible 7% 5%
percentage of which has deductible of e 200 33% 18%
percentage of which has deductible of e 300 11% 10%
percentage of which has deductible of e 400 3% 4%
percentage of which has deductible of e 500 22% 31%
average annual premium paid for basic insurance (in e) 1014.72 1025.04
average annual premium basic insurance before discounts (in e) 1053.24 1059.96
∗ Source: Vektis (2007)
Table 4: Percentage of searchers by received number of offers for a group contract and labor
market status.
All Employed Retired Other
no offer for group contract 31% (267) 45% (95) 17% (117) 36% (55)
1 offer for group contract 47% (377) 50% (208) 33% (114) 65% (54)
2+ offers for group contract 58% (309) 65% (193) 38% (76) 63% (40)
average 46% (953) 55% (496) 28% (307) 53% (150)
Note: number of observations in parentheses.
Note: other contains unemployed, disabled, in full-time education and home duties.
contract, while 33% of the individuals received multiple offers for a group contract. The
table shows that searching is positively related to the number of offers for a group contract
received. This remains true after stratifying the sample by labor market status.
Expected health care use was asked in the April 2006 questionnaire. Respondents had
six options, answers 1 to 5 formed a categorical scale from very little to very much. The
sixth answer was don’t know. The 9% of individuals that answered don’t know were removed
from the sample for all analyses that involved the use of the variable expected health care
use. Furthermore, the categories much and very much were merged, because only very few
individuals expected to use very much health care.
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5 Empirical results
This section provides insight in how well the consumer search model describes observed
behavior at the time of the Dutch health insurance reform. We start with testing the model’s
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with worse health are more likely to buy health insurance with
high coverage (adverse selection).
Adverse selection implies that individuals with high expected health care needs (those in
bad health) take a higher level of insurance coverage, i.e. buy more supplementary insurance.
We test for adverse selection by investigating how the degree of supplementary coverage de-
pends on expected health care use and on self-assessed health. Taking the premium of the
supplementary insurance as a measure for coverage is not appealing, because of premium dis-
counts in group contracts and the large variation in insurance premiums between insurers.
Alternatively, we construct a measure that relates the additional expenditures on supple-
mentary insurance to the price of the basic package. We define the degree of supplementary
coverage as the ratio of the premium for supplementary insurance (before discounts) over
the premium for basic insurance (before discounts). This gives the degree of supplemental
insurance coverage as a fraction of basic insurance coverage, the latter being the same for
all individuals at all insurers.
Table 5 presents the results of regressions for supplemental insurance coverage. Column
(1) shows the results of a base specification where only expected health care use is included.
Individuals who expect very little use of health care (the reference group) have significantly
lower supplementary insurance coverage than individuals who expect to use more health
care (i.e. little, average or (very) much expected care use). Beyond the reference category
’very little expected care’ supplementary insurance coverage is not increasing in expected
health care use. This suggests threshold behavior, which is consistent with our consumer
search model. Individuals with very little expected health care use prefer a low level of
(supplementary) insurance coverage. If the expected health care use is more than very little,
it is beneficial to take higher supplementary insurance coverage.
22
Table 5: Estimation results from regressing supplementary insurance coverage.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
very little expected care 0 0 0 0
little expected care 0.033∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.028∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
average expected care 0.035∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
(very) much expected care 0.024 0.032∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.035∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
physical health 0.011∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(1=excellent, 5=very poor) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
mental health −0.009 −0.010 −0.008 −0.008
(1=excellent, 5=very poor) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
annual basic insurance −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0002∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0002∗ −0.0003∗∗∗
premium (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
female 0.016∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
low income −0.034∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
very low income −0.062∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021)
age 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004)
single 0.001 −0.001
(0.015) (0.014)
has children 0.005 0.004
(0.011) (0.010)
years of education 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
intercept 0.233 0.252 0.510 0.637 0.447 0.571 0.421 0.563
(0.014) (0.016) (0.110) (0.113) (0.110) (0.117) (0.123) (0.124)
observations 858 933 858 933 823 893 817 888
∗∗∗=significant at 1% level, ∗∗= significant at 5% level, ∗=significant at 10% level
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Table 6: How did expected health care use affect your insurance choice?
Expected use of health care
not much,
very little little not little (very)much
bought extensive supplementary coverage 6.7% 12.0% 16.0% 25.8%
bought very limited or no supplementary coverage 9.2% 11.5% 5.2% 2.5%
observations 120 357 369 198
The question on expected health care use was asked in the same questionnaire as the
question on the health insurance choice (April 2006). This may cause two problems. First,
expected health care use is asked over the full calendar year of 2006, and individuals might
already have a partial observation on their health care use. This can potentially weaken
the link between expectations and insurance choice. Furthermore, individuals report their
expected health care use after having decided about their health insurance plan. The ex-
pected health care use may thus reflect adverse selection as well as moral hazard. To get
a better idea of the importance of adverse selection, we also consider the question Did you
take into account the amount of health care you expect to use this year in deciding upon
which health insurance to purchase? When answering positively, individuals could indicate
I bought extensive supplementary coverage, or I bought very limited supplementary coverage
or I bought no supplementary coverage. Because this question refers to expected health care
use at the time the insurance decision was made, it separates adverse selection from moral
hazard. We group very little and no supplementary coverage and show the answers in Table
6, broken down by expected health care use. Indeed, the higher the expected health care
use, the more likely it is that an individual took more extensive supplementary coverage.
As an alternative to expected health care use, we can also use self-assessed health to
investigate adverse selection. Recall that self-assessed health is asked only at the moment
an individual first enters the panel. For our sample it is therefore always asked before the
reform, and thus before individuals had to decide on their insurance plan. Column (2)
of Table 5 shows the results from regressing supplementary health insurance coverage on
self-assessed physical and mental health. Only physical health has a significant impact on
the health insurance decision. Recall that a higher value of health indicates worse health.
Individuals with a good physical health thus obtain on average less extensive supplementary
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health insurance coverage. This indicates adverse selection, which, again, confirms the first
hypothesis from the consumer search model.
Hypothesis 2: A lower premium induces individuals to take more health insurance cover-
age.
To investigate this second hypothesis we regress the supplementary insurance coverage
not only on expected health care use or self-assessed health, but also on the premium for
the basic health insurance. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 report the results. The basic
insurance premium has a significant negative impact on supplementary insurance coverage.
Individuals who pay a lower premium are more likely to obtain more supplementary insurance
coverage (even after controlling for expected health care use or health), which confirms the
second hypothesis from our consumer search model.
To investigate the robustness of this conclusion, we add additional control variables.
First, in the columns (5) and (6), we include gender and income. Women take, on average,
more health insurance coverage, which is consistent with the common belief that women are
more risk averse than men. Furthermore, health insurance is a normal good (i.e. health
insurance coverage increases significantly with the income of individuals). But more impor-
tant, the effect of the premium on supplementary health insurance coverage hardly changes
and remains negative and significant. This remains when adding age, household composition
and years of education to the regression (see columns (7) and (8)). None of these covari-
ates has a significant effect on supplementary health insurance coverage, and other covariate
effects do not change after including these additional variables.
Corollary 1: Receiving a group offer can only be positively correlated to search if the prob-
ability of receiving a group offer is negatively correlated to search costs.
Recall from the previous section that individuals with an offer for a group contract
indicate to search, on average, more often for a new health insurance contract (see Table
4). Although this indicates a positive relation between the probability to search and the
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probability to receive a group offer, we have to be cautious. A potential problem here is that
individuals might consider the offer for a group contract as a new health insurance contract.
They may then classify themselves as searchers after having compared the initial offer with
the offer for a group contract, which is not considered as searching in our model. Therefore,
we also consider the follow-up question: What sources did you use when searching for a health
insurance contract? Multiple answers were allowed, and there was room to mention other
sources than the ones listed in the questionnaire. Individuals most often report having used
the internet (73%), especially websites that compare insurance contracts from all insurers
(84% of those having used the internet) and websites of insurers (80% of those having used
internet). Other answers included advice from a family member (23%), contact with a health
insurer via e-mail or telephone (21%) and advertisements (19%).
We consider as a stricter definition for search only using (independent) websites that
compare insurance contracts of all insurers. According to this definition, 32% of those with
an offer for a group contract, and only 19% of those without an offer for a group contract,
have searched. Table 7 shows the results of a probit model for the effect of an offer for a
group contract on search behavior, using the strict definition for searching. Column (1) shows
that individuals with an offer for a group contract have a significantly higher propensity to
search. Column (2) shows that this association remains after controlling for labor market
status. In column (3) we also add the premium p0 of the initial offer. This column shows
that individuals with an offer for a group contract are significantly more likely to search if
the price of the initial offer was high. The opposite is true for individuals without an offer for
a group contract, although only significant at the 10% level. These individuals are less likely
to search if the initial offer was high. This result remains after controlling for additional
observed characteristics (see column (4)).
A possible explanation why a higher premium of the initial offer reduces search for indi-
viduals without a group offer is that individuals do not know the distribution of premiums
F (p) in the market. Individuals believing that the variation in premiums is low, are likely to
decide not to search. Individuals who received an offer for a group contract may realize that
the variation in premiums is larger than assumed, which may induce them to search actively.
Although we do not have any direct evidence on individual beliefs, it is relevant to note that
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Table 7: Probit model for searching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
offer for group contract 0.417∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ −14.612∗∗∗ −13.949∗∗
(0.093) (0.098) (5.417) (5.729)
employed −0.047 −0.053 −0.237∗
(0.122) (0.124) (0.140)
retired −0.692∗∗∗ −0.687∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.142) (0.183)
annual basic insurance premium offered −0.008∗ −0.008∗
∗no offer for group contract (0.005) (0.005)
annual basic insurance premium offered 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗
∗offer for group contract (0.002) (0.002)
female 0.056
(0.104)
years of education 0.054∗∗
(0.021)
age −0.014∗∗∗
(0.005)
low income −0.090
(0.116)
very low income 0.015
(0.220)
single −0.064
(0.136)
children −0.064
(0.108)
intercept −0.890 −0.617 7.943 8.120
(0.082) (0.122) (4.820) (5.130)
observations 1143 1143 948 893
∗∗∗=significant at 1% level, ∗∗= significant at 5% level, ∗=significant at 10% level.
Note: the strict definition for search, i.e. search via comparison websites, is used here.
Note: column (2)-(4) applies the Conniffe and O’Neill (2008) correction for missing covariates.
before the reform the government announced that the average annual premium would be
about e1106. The actual premiums were between e990 and e1120, so almost all insurers
had a lower premium. This may imply that after learning their premium, most individuals
believed that they received a good offer. If individuals are unaware of the distribution of
premiums, then those with a high premium offer (close to that announced by the govern-
ment) might have believed that the variation in premiums was very low and thus would not
have searched further. While those with a low premium offer may have overestimated the
variation in premiums, and thus searched for an even lower premium.
Table 8 shows the percentage of individuals that switches insurer at the moment of the
reform. We distinguish between those with and without an offer for a group contract, and
those who did and did not search the market for better offers. As one might expect individuals
who have searched the market, and those who received an offer for a group contract, are
much more likely to switch insurer than their counterparts. In the table we used the strict
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Table 8: Percentage of switchers by offer receival for group contract and search behavior
offer for group contract no offer for group contract
search no search search no search
switched insurer 34% 15% 28% 3%
not switched insurer 66% 85% 72% 97%
observations 417 410 92 220
Note: the strict definition for search, i.e. search via comparison websites, is used here.
definition of searching, which explains why some individuals who did not receive an offer
for a group contract, and who did not search, still switch insurer. This table shows that
searching actually increases the likelihood of switching insurer, and thus measures relevant
individual behavior.
So what emerges from above is a strong positive correlation between having received
an offer for a group contract and searching. This implies according to corollary 1 that
unobserved search costs should be negatively related to the probability of receiving an offer
for a group contract, or stated differently, individuals with low search costs are more likely
to receive an offer for a group contract. We discuss the possible mechanisms in the next
section.
Corollary 2: Health can only be positively correlated to searching, if health and search
costs are negatively correlated.
Individuals in bad health derive more expected utility from a health insurance with
extensive supplementary coverage. Recall from the first hypothesis that this adverse selection
was present in the data. If within the population health and search costs are uncorrelated,
we should observe that individuals in bad health are more likely to search. However, if health
is negatively correlated with search costs, we may even find a positive correlation (since we
cannot condition on the unobserved level of search costs).
In Table 9 we show estimation results for a probit model for the search decision, where
we include health as an explanatory variable. Again, we use expected health care utilization
and self-assessed health as measures for individual health. Columns (1) and (2) indicate that
both expected health care use and self-assessed health do not have a significant impact on
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Table 9: Probit model for searching.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
very little expected care 0 0 0 0
little expected use −0.178 −0.268 −0.261 −0.219
(0.138) (0.169) (0.172) (0.176)
average expected use −0.084 −0.187 −0.175 −0.069
(0.136) (0.167) (0.170) (0.176)
(very) much expected use −0.247 −0.083 −0.054 0.084
(0.152) (0.185) (0.190) (0.197)
physical health −0.061 0.002 0.037 0.096
(1=excellent, 5=very poor) (0.050) (0.062) (0.064) (0.066)
mental health −0.012 −0.073 −0.082 −0.070
(1=excellent, 5=very poor) (0.048) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064)
offered annual premium 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
basic insurance (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
female 0.130 0.145 0.065 0.057
(0.107) (0.103) (0.118) (0.113)
low income −0.280∗∗ −0.317∗∗∗ −0.081 −0.106
(0.118) (0.113) (0.130) (0.125)
very low income −0.402∗ −0.425∗∗ 0.094 0.036
(0.215) (0.205) (0.253) (0.241)
age −0.014∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
single −0.221 −0.166
(0.158) (0.154)
children −0.049 −0.025
(0.123) (0.120)
years of education 0.078∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023)
intercept −0.408 −0.382 −3.208 −3.126 −2.781 −2.529 −3.148 −3.086
(0.118) (0.137) (2.005) (1.995) (2.087) (2.081) (2.133) (2.125)
observations 1040 1128 649 711 620 678 617 675
∗∗∗=significant at 1% level, ∗∗= significant at 5% level, ∗=significant at 10% level.
Note: the strict definition for search, i.e. search via comparison websites, is used here.
search behavior. In columns (3) and (4) we add the premium of the initial offer, but this
does not change the effect of health on search behavior. Finally, in columns (5)-(8), we add
individual characteristics. Again, this does not change the effect of health on search behavior.
Columns (5) and (6) point out an effect of income on search behavior. If we include age and
education, in columns (7) and (8), the effect of income is absorbed in these variables. The
estimation results do not provide any strong evidence regarding the relationship between
health and the probability to search.
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6 Explaining group contracts
The finding that the positive correlation between receiving a group offer and the probability
to search can only be explained by receiving a group offer being negatively correlated to
search costs, raises the question what mechanisms could underly this negative correlation.
In this section we discuss a number of possible pathways and investigate their importance
in explaining the negative correlation between receiving a group offer and search costs.
Group offers are mainly made via employers. The probability of receiving an offer for
a group contract is thus related to employment status. An offer for a group contract also
includes coverage for the spouse. Having an employed spouse increases the probability of
receiving a group offer. Couples may have economies of scale when searching for a health
insurance. Indeed within 85% of the couples both partners have the same insurer. This
may thus be a first mechanism explaining why low search costs are associated to offers for
group contracts. In Table 10, the effect of the number of employed partners in the household
on the probability of searching is shown. Column (1) only corrects for receiving an offer
for a group contract and some individual characteristics. Column(2) adds the number of
employed partners as additional control. Comparing columns (1) and (2) shows that taking
into account the number of employed partners reduces the positive association between the
probability to search and having an offer for a group contract, but the correlation remains
substantial and significant. This mechanism can explain some, but not all, of the negative
correlation between receiving a group offer and search costs.
Individuals receiving an offer for a group contract may not be a random sample. To
get some insight in the determinants of receiving such an offer, we estimate a probit model.
Column (1) of Table 11 shows that employed individuals are, indeed, more likely to receive
an offer and that health does not have a significant impact. This might be interpreted as
evidence that the risk equalization fund works well. Adding income and education (results
in column (2)) shows that individuals with a higher income are more likely to receive an
offer for a group contract. Before the reform high income workers were privately insured.
An indicator for being privately insured prior to the reform does only has a significant effect
when when income is not included as covariate. The positive association between income
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Table 10: Probit model for searching.
(1) (2) (3)
offer for group contract 0.421∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.102) (0.107)
one employed partner 0.494∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.127)
two employed partners 0.531∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.131)
knowledge reform 0.068∗∗∗
(0.015)
female 0.212∗∗ 0.140 0.196∗∗
(0.088) (0.088) (0.093)
years of education 0.051∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.023
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
low income −0.115 −0.041 −0.065
(0.104) (0.106) (0.111)
very low income −0.030 0.128 0.076
(0.177) (0.180) (0.187)
little expected health care use −0.160 0.002 −0.042
(0.144) (0.123) (0.129)
average expected health care use −0.019 0.189 0.165
(0.143) (0.122) (0.127)
(very) much expected health care use −0.204 0.075 0.069
(0.161) (0.143) (0.149)
intercept −1.447 −1.841 −1.819
(0.301) (0.292) (0.307)
observations 968 854 800
∗∗∗=significant at 1% level, ∗∗= significant at 5% level, ∗=significant at 10% level.
Note: the strict definition for search, i.e. search via comparison websites, is used here.
Note: columns (2) and (3) apply the Conniffe and O’Neill (2008) correction for missing covariates.
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Table 11: Probit model for receiving an offer for a group contract
(1) (2) (3) (4)
employed 0.574∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗
(0.125) (0.136) (0.142) (0.147)
retired −0.008 −0.068 −0.067 −0.035
(0.128) (0.134) (0.140) (0.179)
little expected use −0.082 −0.124 −0.119 −0.098
(0.129) (0.135) (0.140) (0.141)
average expected use 0.032 −0.016 0.032 0.062
(0.126) (0.132) (0.137) (0.139)
(very) much expected use 0.011 −0.003 −0.012 0.002
(0.144) (0.150) (0.156) (0.157)
years education 0.025 0.027 0.026
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
low income −0.231∗∗ −0.198∗ −0.223∗∗
(0.108) (0.113) (0.114)
very low income −0.495∗∗∗ −0.455∗∗ −0.384∗∗
(0.179) (0.184) (0.201)
knowledge reform 0.030∗ 0.031∗
(0.016) (0.016)
female −0.104
(0.108)
age −0.003
(0.005)
single −0.057
(0.134)
has children 0.051
(0.115)
intercept 0.321 0.307 0.124 0.350
(0.139) (0.286) (0.299) (0.452)
observations 952 910 846 833
∗∗∗=significant at 1% level, ∗∗= significant at 5% level, ∗=significant at 10% level
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and offers for group may thus as well reflect previous health insurance.
There may be several reasons why the type of health insurance before the reform may
affect the likelihood of receiving an offer for a group contract. First, before the reform, firms
with many high income employees already used to have an arrangement with an insurer that
offered insurance at a lower rate. Second, higher educated and higher income employees
might push their employer harder to establish a group contract. Higher incomes are thus
more likely to receive an offer. However, this can only be an explanation for the negative
correlation between search costs and group contract offers, if high income individuals have
lower search costs. Before the reform high income individuals had to obtain private health
insurance and were thus familiar with making health insurance choices.
A requirement for searching is that individuals understand the system after the reform.
For example, even using the comparison websites requires individuals to give in some prefer-
ences for the insurance contract. Our data contain a questionnaire examining the knowledge
about the new health insurance system. In particular, individuals were asked to answer true
or false (or do not know) to 15 statements. Our knowledge variable equals the number of
correct answers minus the number of wrong answers. This guarantees that someone who
does not know an answer, gets the same expected score when guessing as when answering
do not know. The average score in our population equals 4.2 (with a maximum of 13 and
a minimum of -7). The statements were included in the survey of October 2005 (so before
premiums were announced and offers for group contracts were made), and thus measures
knowledge prior to making the search decision. In column (3) of Table 11 we add this knowl-
edge variable. The results show that those who had more knowledge about the new system
were much more likely to (later) receive an offer for a group contract. Adding additional
controls (age, gender, household composition) does not change this result, as is shown in
column (4).
Including the knowledge variable in the probit model for searching (column (3) of Table
10) reduces the impact of having received an offer for a group contract somewhat, but still
a substantial and significant effect remains. This implies that while employment status and
knowledge about the system are important for the relationship between search costs and
group offers, this cannot be the full explanation. What are possible explanations for the
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remaining association? First, as we already explained in Section 5 individuals may use the
group contract offer to update the beliefs about the distribution of premiums F (p), which
may induce them to search. Second, an offer for a group contract may force individuals to
compare two offers and thus reduce further search costs.
The insurance premium of the group contract is for almost all insurers below the lowest
premium in the regular market. Insurers may target offers for group contracts to individuals
with low search costs. The remaining population of individuals without a group contract
offer has, on average, higher search costs. This allows insurers to set higher premiums. This
argument follows Stahl (1989), who shows within a consumer search model that if the number
of informed (low costs) individuals is reduced (as is the case in the market for individual
contracts), price dispersion increases as it does not pay for firms to compete for the lowest
price.
The main reason for the government to allow for group contracts was that it would create
the possibility for insurers to insure a substantial share of the employees of a firm and at
the same time also insure the firm for the costs of, for example, sickness absenteeism. It
was hoped that such combinations of insurances would induce insurers to put more effort
in prevention of health related absences from work. What was not foreseen, was that the
possibility of offering group contracts hence facilitates insurers to apply third degree price
discrimination, which may be welfare reducing.
7 Discussion and conclusion
We presented a simple consumer search model for individual health insurance decisions at the
moment of the Dutch health insurance reform. The model provided two hypotheses and two
corollaries. Our data confirm both hypotheses on the choice for insurance plan. In particular,
there is adverse selection in the market and health insurance coverage is decreasing in the
premium.
The data also revealed that the probability of receiving a group offer is positively cor-
related with the probability to search. According the corollary this can only be the case if
the probability of receiving a group offer is negatively related to search costs. We find an
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important role for knowledge about the health care system. Those with more knowledge
about the reform and the health care system are more likely to receive an offer for a group
contract. For public policy it might be a serious concern that better informed individuals
are more likely to receive an offer for a group contract. This might suggest that insurers use
group contracts for cream-skimming, for example, by setting high premiums, but offering
maximum discounts on group contracts to low health-risks employees. Furthermore, the
group contracts take better informed individuals out of the regular market, which allows
insurers to exploit the higher search costs of the remaining individuals in this segment. This
will lead to lower competition, and more price dispersion. Since we saw that the choice of
health insurance coverage is strongly related to the premium, it may also affect equity and
access to health care within the population.
The system of managed competition seems to be successful in keeping premiums for health
insurance low. In the year of the introduction insurers incurred substantial losses, mainly
because of their attempts to attract as many insurees as possible. At that time experts
feared that premiums would increase sharply to compensate for these losses. However, the
rise in premiums was low in 2007 and 2008 and even negative in 2009. One might argue that
the willingness of individuals to switch created enough competition to withhold insurers to
increase premiums.
35
References
Brown, J.R. and Goolsbee, A., 2002. ”Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive?
Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry”, Journal of Political Economy 110, p.481-
507.
Buchmueller, T.C., Feldstein, P.J. and Strombom, B.A., 2002. ”Switching Costs, Price
Sensitivity and Health Plan Choice”, Journal of Health Economics 21, p.89-116.
Carlson, J.A. and McAfee, R.P., 1983. ”Discrete Equilibrium Price Dispersion”, The Jour-
nal of Political Economy 91, p.480-493.
Conniffe, D. and O’Neill, D., 2008. ”An Efficient Estimator for Dealing with Missing
Data on Explanatory Variables in a Probit Choice Model”, NUIM Working Paper
#N1960908.
Dutch Health Care Authority (NZa, Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit), 2006. ”De tussenstand op
de verzekeringsmarkt. Monitor zorgverzekeringsmarkt juni 2006” (The interim score
on the health insurance market. Monitor health insurance market June 2006).
Janssen, M.C.W. and Moraga-Gonza´lez, J.L., 2004. ”Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search
and the Number of Firms”, Review of Economics and Statistics 71, p.1089-1118.
Janssen, M.C.W., Moraga-Gonza´lez, J.L. and Wildenbeest, M.R., 2005. ”Truly costly
sequential search and oligopolistic pricing”, International Journal of Industrial Organ-
isation 23, p.451-466.
Maestas, N., Schroeder, M. and Goldman, D., 2009. ”Price Variation in Markets with
Homogeneous Goods: the Case of Medigap”, NBER Working Paper 14679.
Pauly, M.V., Herring, B. and Song, D., 2006. ”Information Technology and Consumer
Search for Health Insurance”, International Journal of the Economics of Business 13,
45-63.
Salop, S. and Stiglitz, J., 1977. ”Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Com-
petitive Price Dispersion”, The Review of Economic Studies 44, p.493-510.
36
Sorensen, A.T., 2000. ”Equilibrium Price Dispersion in Retail Markets for Prescription
Drugs”, Journal of Political Economy 108, p.833-850.
Sorensen, A.T., 2001. ”An Empirical Model of Heterogeneous Consumer Search for Retail
Prescription Drugs”, NBER Working Paper 8548.
Stahl, D.O., 1989. ”Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search”, American
Economic Review 79, p. 700-712.
Vektis, 2007. ”Zorgmonitor. Jaarboek 2007. Financiering van de zorg in 2006” (Health
care monitor. Yearbook 2007. Financing health care in 2006).
37
